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	Game-Theoretic Design of Optimal Two-Sided Rating Protocols for Service Exchange Dilemma in Crowdsourcing
	Lu, J.; Xin, Y.; Zhang, Z.; Liu, X.; Li, K.
刊名	IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
	2018
卷号	Vol.13 No.11页码:2801-2815
关键词	differential punishment game theory incentive mechanism rating protocol Service exchange sustainable social norm
ISSN号	1556-6013
URL标识	查看原文
公开日期	[db:dc_date_available]
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/5469349
专题	湖南大学
作者单位	1.a Department of Computer Science and Engineering, Zhejiang Normal University, Jinhua, 321004, China 2.State Key Laboratory for Novel Software Technology, Nanjing University, Nanjing, 210023, China 3.School of Computer, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, 410073, China 4.College of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering, Hunan University, Changsha, 410082, China 5.National Supercomputing Center in Changsha, Changsha, 410082, China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Lu, J.,Xin, Y.,Zhang, Z.,et al. Game-Theoretic Design of Optimal Two-Sided Rating Protocols for Service Exchange Dilemma in Crowdsourcing[J]. IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,2018,Vol.13 No.11:2801-2815.
APA	Lu, J.,Xin, Y.,Zhang, Z.,Liu, X.,&Li, K..(2018).Game-Theoretic Design of Optimal Two-Sided Rating Protocols for Service Exchange Dilemma in Crowdsourcing.IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security,Vol.13 No.11,2801-2815.
MLA	Lu, J.,et al."Game-Theoretic Design of Optimal Two-Sided Rating Protocols for Service Exchange Dilemma in Crowdsourcing".IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security Vol.13 No.11(2018):2801-2815.

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