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	Strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility game with bounded service range
	Yukun Cheng; Qiaoming Han; Wei Yu; Guochuan Zhang
刊名	Journal of Combinatorial Optimization
	2019
卷号	Vol.37 No.1页码:737-755
关键词	Algorithmic mechanism design Obnoxious facility location Service radius Social choice
ISSN号	1382-6905;1573-2886
URL标识	查看原文
公开日期	[db:dc_date_available]
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/4747112
专题	湖南大学
作者单位	1.Suzhou Key Laboratory for Big Data and Information Service,School of Business, Suzhou University of Science and Technology,Suzhou,China 2.School of Data Science,Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics,Hangzhou,China 3.Department of Mathematics,East China University of Science and Technology,Shanghai,China 4.College of Computer Science and Technology,Zhejiang University,Hangzhou,China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Yukun Cheng,Qiaoming Han,Wei Yu,et al. Strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility game with bounded service range[J]. Journal of Combinatorial Optimization,2019,Vol.37 No.1:737-755.
APA	Yukun Cheng,Qiaoming Han,Wei Yu,&Guochuan Zhang.(2019).Strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility game with bounded service range.Journal of Combinatorial Optimization,Vol.37 No.1,737-755.
MLA	Yukun Cheng,et al."Strategy-proof mechanisms for obnoxious facility game with bounded service range".Journal of Combinatorial Optimization Vol.37 No.1(2019):737-755.

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