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Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games
Quan, Ji; Zheng, Junjun*; Wang, Xianjia; Yang, Xiukang
刊名SCIENTIFIC REPORTS
2019
卷号9期号:1页码:8208
ISSN号2045-2322
DOI10.1038/s41598-019-44725-y
URL标识查看原文
WOS记录号WOS:000469912700049
内容类型期刊论文
URI标识http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3373488
专题武汉理工大学
作者单位1.[Quan, Ji
2.Yang, Xiukang] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China.
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GB/T 7714
Quan, Ji,Zheng, Junjun*,Wang, Xianjia,et al. Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games[J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,2019,9(1):8208.
APA Quan, Ji,Zheng, Junjun*,Wang, Xianjia,&Yang, Xiukang.(2019).Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games.SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,9(1),8208.
MLA Quan, Ji,et al."Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games".SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 9.1(2019):8208.
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