Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games | |
Quan, Ji; Zheng, Junjun*; Wang, Xianjia; Yang, Xiukang | |
刊名 | SCIENTIFIC REPORTS |
2019 | |
卷号 | 9期号:1页码:8208 |
ISSN号 | 2045-2322 |
DOI | 10.1038/s41598-019-44725-y |
URL标识 | 查看原文 |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000469912700049 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
URI标识 | http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3373488 |
专题 | 武汉理工大学 |
作者单位 | 1.[Quan, Ji 2.Yang, Xiukang] Wuhan Univ Technol, Sch Management, Wuhan 430070, Peoples R China. |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Quan, Ji,Zheng, Junjun*,Wang, Xianjia,et al. Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games[J]. SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,2019,9(1):8208. |
APA | Quan, Ji,Zheng, Junjun*,Wang, Xianjia,&Yang, Xiukang.(2019).Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games.SCIENTIFIC REPORTS,9(1),8208. |
MLA | Quan, Ji,et al."Benefits of asynchronous exclusion for the evolution of cooperation in stochastic evolutionary optional public goods games".SCIENTIFIC REPORTS 9.1(2019):8208. |
个性服务 |
查看访问统计 |
相关权益政策 |
暂无数据 |
收藏/分享 |
除非特别说明,本系统中所有内容都受版权保护,并保留所有权利。
修改评论