代理权竞争、控股股东资金占用与公司绩效——基于不完全契约理论视角 Discussion on the agency competition, controlling shareholder's embezzlement of funds and firm performance based on incomplete contract theory perspective | |
李柱[1] | |
2011 | |
页码 | 77-78 |
URL标识 | 查看原文 |
内容类型 | 期刊论文 |
URI标识 | http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/3063774 |
专题 | 重庆大学 |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | 李柱[1]. 代理权竞争、控股股东资金占用与公司绩效——基于不完全契约理论视角 Discussion on the agency competition, controlling shareholder's embezzlement of funds and firm performance based on incomplete contract theory perspective[J],2011:77-78. |
APA | 李柱[1].(2011).代理权竞争、控股股东资金占用与公司绩效——基于不完全契约理论视角 Discussion on the agency competition, controlling shareholder's embezzlement of funds and firm performance based on incomplete contract theory perspective.,77-78. |
MLA | 李柱[1]."代理权竞争、控股股东资金占用与公司绩效——基于不完全契约理论视角 Discussion on the agency competition, controlling shareholder's embezzlement of funds and firm performance based on incomplete contract theory perspective".(2011):77-78. |
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