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	Mechanism design for e-procurement auctions: On the efficacy of post-auction negotiation and quality effort incentives
	Huang, He[1]; Kauffman, Robert J.[2]; Xu, Hongyan[1]; Zhao, Lan[3]
	2011
卷号	10页码:650-672
URL标识	查看原文
内容类型	期刊论文
URI标识	http://www.corc.org.cn/handle/1471x/2966111
专题	重庆大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Huang, He[1],Kauffman, Robert J.[2],Xu, Hongyan[1],et al. Mechanism design for e-procurement auctions: On the efficacy of post-auction negotiation and quality effort incentives[J],2011,10:650-672.
APA	Huang, He[1],Kauffman, Robert J.[2],Xu, Hongyan[1],&Zhao, Lan[3].(2011).Mechanism design for e-procurement auctions: On the efficacy of post-auction negotiation and quality effort incentives.,10,650-672.
MLA	Huang, He[1],et al."Mechanism design for e-procurement auctions: On the efficacy of post-auction negotiation and quality effort incentives".10(2011):650-672.

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