The impact of investor protection law on global takeovers: LBO vs. non-LBO transactions | |
Cao, Xiaping1,2; Cumming, Douglas3; Goh, Jeremy4; Wang, Xiaoming5 | |
2019-03 | |
关键词 | Leveraged buyouts Legal environment Law Premium Shareholder rights Club deals Value effect Investor protection |
卷号 | 59 |
DOI | 10.1016/j.intfin.2018.11.012 |
页码 | 1-18 |
英文摘要 | This paper examines the impact of investor protection laws on value creation in LBOs versus non-LBO takeovers. We find that value creation measured by takeover premium is significantly higher in countries with better investor protection. The value effect of investor protection laws is more pronounced for LBOs than non-LBO takeover transactions. Among LBOs, investor protection's value effect is lower for club deals than others. These results suggest that institutional context and legal environment determine the extent of value creation for takeovers around the world. (C) 2018 Published by Elsevier B.V. |
会议录出版者 | ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV |
会议录出版地 | PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS |
语种 | 英语 |
WOS研究方向 | Business & Economics |
WOS记录号 | WOS:000460680900001 |
内容类型 | 会议论文 |
源URL | [http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/3327] |
专题 | 上海财经大学 |
作者单位 | 1.Sun Yat Sen Univ, Guangzhou, Guangdong, Peoples R China; 2.Jinagxi Inst Finance & Dev, Nanchang, Jiangxi, Peoples R China; 3.Florida Atlantic Univ, Coll Business, Boca Raton, FL 33431 USA; 4.Singapore Management Univ, Singapore, Singapore; 5.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China |
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714 | Cao, Xiaping,Cumming, Douglas,Goh, Jeremy,et al. The impact of investor protection law on global takeovers: LBO vs. non-LBO transactions[C]. 见:. |
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