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	Nonlinear pricing with arbitrage: on the role of correlation
	Meng, Dawen; Tian, Guoqiang
	2008
关键词	nonlinear pricing weakly collusion-proof arbitrage correlated types
页码	24-28
英文摘要	The traditional nonlinear pricing theory tackles the individual incentive compatibility but does not address the possibility that buyers could form coalition to conduct arbitrage. Jeon and Menicucci (2005) study the optimal collusion-proof selling mechanism under asymmetric information. They show that collusion is preventable at no cost when the buyers' types are uncorrelated. In this paper we extend their result to the case with correlated types. We find that when the types of agents are weakly negatively correlated, the optimal weakly collusion-proof mechanism calls for distortions away from allocation efficiency obtained without collusion.
会议录出版者	UNIVERSE ACADEMIC PRESS TORONTO
会议录出版地	1 SPADINA CRESCENT, ROOM 205, TORONTO, ONTARIO M5S 3G3, CANADA
语种	英语
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics ; Mathematics
WOS记录号	WOS:000259115100004
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/3199]
专题	上海财经大学
作者单位	Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Econ Sch, Shanghai Inst Foreign Trade, Int Business Sch, Shanghai 201600, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Meng, Dawen,Tian, Guoqiang. Nonlinear pricing with arbitrage: on the role of correlation[C]. 见:.

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