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	Optimal self-enforcement and termination
	Wang, Cheng1; Yang, Youzhi2
	2019-04
关键词	Optimal contracting Outside opportunities Self-enforcement Termination
卷号	101
DOI	10.1016/j.jedc.2018.12.010
页码	161-186
英文摘要	We study a principal-agent problem where the agent receives a stochastic outside opportunity (offer) each period, and he cannot commit to the ongoing contractual relationship. Termination, which is costly, allows the principal to go back to an external market to hire a new agent. The principal responds strategically to the agent's outside offers, choosing optimally between retaining the agent, which must be self-enforced, and terminating him, which then ends the current contract. The model generates both voluntary and involuntary terminations, and dynamics and stationarity outcomes that are of interest especially for understanding employment relationships with on-the-job search. (C) 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
会议录出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE BV
会议录出版地	PO BOX 211, 1000 AE AMSTERDAM, NETHERLANDS
语种	英语
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
WOS记录号	WOS:000465060700009
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/2978]
专题	上海财经大学
作者单位	1.Fudan Univ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 2.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wang, Cheng,Yang, Youzhi. Optimal self-enforcement and termination[C]. 见:.

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