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	The Effect of Compensation System on the Dispute Resolution of Securities False Statement in China: A Law and Economics Analysis
	Wang, Lin
刊名	ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
	2018-12
卷号	9期号:3
关键词	dispute resolution evolutionary game securities false statement systemic risk
ISSN号	2194-6086
DOI	10.1515/ajle-2018-0012
英文摘要	This article examines the effects of compensation system in the dispute resolution of securities false statement. Firstly, this paper develops an evolutionary game model to analyze the evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) of the dispute resolution. Then, we analyze the factor which influence the choice of the parties from an economics perspective. Expected compensation and expected systemic risk are more influential to the decision of the parties by derivation. Moreover, we test the theoretical deduction with statistics description of the private securities litigation in China. In conclusion, the irrational expectation of the litigation income, which influences the strategy selection of the parties and results in more lawsuits.
WOS研究方向	Government & Law
语种	英语
出版者	WALTER DE GRUYTER GMBH
WOS记录号	WOS:000452177100004
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/453]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Wang, Lin
作者单位	Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Law, Shanghai, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Wang, Lin. The Effect of Compensation System on the Dispute Resolution of Securities False Statement in China: A Law and Economics Analysis[J]. ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS,2018,9(3).
APA	Wang, Lin.(2018).The Effect of Compensation System on the Dispute Resolution of Securities False Statement in China: A Law and Economics Analysis.ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS,9(3).
MLA	Wang, Lin."The Effect of Compensation System on the Dispute Resolution of Securities False Statement in China: A Law and Economics Analysis".ASIAN JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 9.3(2018).

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