Ambiguous persuasion

doi:10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.008

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	Ambiguous persuasion
	Beauchene, Dorian 1; Li, Jian 2; Li, Ming 3,4
刊名	JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
	2019-01
卷号	179 页码:312-365
关键词	Bayesian persuasion Ambiguity aversion Information transmission
ISSN号	0022-0531
DOI	10.1016/j.jet.2018.10.008
英文摘要	We study a persuasion game a la Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) where players are ambiguity averse with maxmin expected utility (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). With no prior ambiguity, a Sender may choose to use ambiguous communication devices. Our main result characterizes the value of optimal ambiguous persuasion, which is often higher than what is feasible under Bayesian persuasion. We characterize posteriors that are potentially plausible when they are generated by ambiguous devices. One way to construct an optimal ambiguous communication device is by using synonyms, messages that lead to the same posteriors, in which Sender can hedge himself against ambiguity while inducing actions from Receiver that would not be possible under standard Bayesian persuasion. We also show that the use of synonyms are a necessary property of optimal and beneficial ambiguous persuasion. We consider two applications, including the well-known uniform-quadratic example. Our analysis provides a justification for how ambiguity may emerge endogenously in persuasion. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
WOS记录号	WOS:000456901200010
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/403]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Li, Jian
作者单位	1.MAPP Econ, Paris, France; 2.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 3.Concordia Univ, Montreal, PQ, Canada; 4.CIREQ, Montreal, PQ, Canada
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Beauchene, Dorian,Li, Jian,Li, Ming. Ambiguous persuasion[J]. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,2019,179:312-365.
APA	Beauchene, Dorian,Li, Jian,&Li, Ming.(2019).Ambiguous persuasion.JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY,179,312-365.
MLA	Beauchene, Dorian,et al."Ambiguous persuasion".JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY 179(2019):312-365.