Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information

doi:10.1007/s00182-018-0637-7

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information
	Li, Zhuozheng 1; Yang, Huanxing 2; Zhang, Lan 3
刊名	INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY
	2019-03
卷号	48 期号:1 页码:109-141
关键词	Cheap talk Coordination game Centralization Decentralization
ISSN号	0020-7276
DOI	10.1007/s00182-018-0637-7
英文摘要	We study several pre-communication protocols in a coordination game with incomplete information. Under decentralized decision making, we show that informative communication can be sustained in equilibrium, yet miscoordination arises with positive probabilities. Moreover, the equilibrium takes a partitional structure and messages are rank ordered, with higher messages becoming increasingly imprecise. Compared to centralized decision making (a mediator without commitment), decentralization leads to more informative communication when the miscoordination cost is high, and performs better when the miscoordination cost is intermediate. We also study the case in which the mediator is able to commit to a decision rule beforehand.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics ; Mathematics ; Mathematical Methods In Social Sciences
语种	英语
出版者	SPRINGER HEIDELBERG
WOS记录号	WOS:000468538600005
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/319]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Zhang, Lan
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Coll Business, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 2.Ohio State Univ, Dept Econ, Columbus, OH 43210 USA; 3.Southwestern Univ Finance & Econ, Res Inst Econ & Management, Chengdu, Sichuan, Peoples R China
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Li, Zhuozheng,Yang, Huanxing,Zhang, Lan. Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information[J]. INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY,2019,48(1):109-141.
APA	Li, Zhuozheng,Yang, Huanxing,&Zhang, Lan.(2019).Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information.INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY,48(1),109-141.
MLA	Li, Zhuozheng,et al."Pre-communication in a coordination game with incomplete information".INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GAME THEORY 48.1(2019):109-141.