Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information

doi:10.1111/1756-2171.12275

CORC > 上海财经大学 > 上海财经大学

	Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information
	Fu, Shiming 1; Krishna, R. Vijay 2
刊名	RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
	2019-06
卷号	50 期号:2 页码:418-452
ISSN号	0741-6261
DOI	10.1111/1756-2171.12275
英文摘要	We study a dynamic agency model where the agent privately observes the firm's cash flows that are subject to persistent shocks. We characterize the policy dynamics and implement the optimal contract by financial securities. Because bad performance distorts investors' beliefs downward, the agent has less incentive to misrepresent information. The agent's compensation is less than what he can divert and is convex in performance. As private information becomes more persistent, (i) the agent is compensated more by stock options; (ii) firm credit limits vary more with history, dropping after bad performance; (iii) the firm is financially constrained for longer time.
WOS研究方向	Business & Economics
语种	英语
出版者	WILEY
WOS记录号	WOS:000466025400007
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://10.2.47.112/handle/2XS4QKH4/245]
专题	上海财经大学
通讯作者	Fu, Shiming
作者单位	1.Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai, Peoples R China; 2.Florida State Univ, Tallahassee, FL 32306 USA
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Fu, Shiming,Krishna, R. Vijay. Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information[J]. RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,2019,50(2):418-452.
APA	Fu, Shiming,&Krishna, R. Vijay.(2019).Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information.RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS,50(2),418-452.
MLA	Fu, Shiming,et al."Dynamic financial contracting with persistent private information".RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS 50.2(2019):418-452.