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	Towards a Secure Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme
	Guo, Hui ; Zhang, Zhenfeng ; Zhang, Jiang ; Chen, Cheng
	2013
会议名称	7th International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec)
会议日期	OCT 23-25, 2013
会议地点	Melaka, MALAYSIA
页码	330-346
中文摘要	Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is an attractive paradigm, which gives good solutions to the problem of delegation of decryption rights. In proxy re-encryption, a semi-trusted proxy translates a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext of the same plaintext for Bob, without learning any information of the underlying message. As far as we know, previous PRE schemes are mainly in traditional public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography, thus they suffer from certificate management problem or key escrow problem in practice. In order to solve these practical problems, we aim at constructing certificateless proxy re-encryption (CL-PRE) schemes. In this paper, we first introduce a security definition against (replayable) chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for certificateless proxy re-encryption. In our security model, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users (in a specific pattern). Then, we give some evidence that it is not easy to construct a secure CL-PRE. Actually, we present an attack to the chosen plaintext secure CL-PRE scheme proposed by Xu et al. [1]. We also show a novel generic construction for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) can not be trivially adapted to CL-PRE by giving an attack to this generic construction. Finally, we present an efficient CL-PRE scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model based on well-known assumptions.
英文摘要	Proxy re-encryption (PRE) is an attractive paradigm, which gives good solutions to the problem of delegation of decryption rights. In proxy re-encryption, a semi-trusted proxy translates a ciphertext for Alice into a ciphertext of the same plaintext for Bob, without learning any information of the underlying message. As far as we know, previous PRE schemes are mainly in traditional public key infrastructure or identity-based cryptography, thus they suffer from certificate management problem or key escrow problem in practice. In order to solve these practical problems, we aim at constructing certificateless proxy re-encryption (CL-PRE) schemes. In this paper, we first introduce a security definition against (replayable) chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) for certificateless proxy re-encryption. In our security model, the adversary is allowed to adaptively corrupt users (in a specific pattern). Then, we give some evidence that it is not easy to construct a secure CL-PRE. Actually, we present an attack to the chosen plaintext secure CL-PRE scheme proposed by Xu et al. [1]. We also show a novel generic construction for certificateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) can not be trivially adapted to CL-PRE by giving an attack to this generic construction. Finally, we present an efficient CL-PRE scheme and prove its security in the random oracle model based on well-known assumptions.
收录类别	CPCI
会议录出版地	SPRINGER-VERLAG BERLIN
语种	英语
ISSN号	0302-9743
ISBN号	978-3-642-41227-1; 978-3-642-41226-4
内容类型	会议论文
源URL	[http://ir.iscas.ac.cn/handle/311060/16525]
专题	软件研究所_软件所图书馆_会议论文
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Guo, Hui,Zhang, Zhenfeng,Zhang, Jiang,et al. Towards a Secure Certificateless Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme[C]. 见:7th International Conference on Provable Security (ProvSec). Melaka, MALAYSIA. OCT 23-25, 2013.

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