QQ客服 官方微博 反馈留言

	Informational Price Cascades and Non-aggregation of Asymmetric Information in Experimental Asset Markets
	Jason Shachat ; Anand Srinivasan
	2013-11-08
出处	http://www.wise.xmu.edu.cn/paperInfor.asp?id=203
关键词	Information cascade information aggregation experiment asset market
英文摘要	We report on experimental markets for a contingent claim asset that eight subjects traded for nine periods before the state was revealed. There is an informative binary signal that arrives after each of the first eight trading rounds. In our baseline treatment the realization of the signal is public information, and in another treatment, market participants are randomly sequenced and receive the signal as private information. In the latter case, we observe zero information aggregation and prices lock in on home grown norms, which we call informational price cascades. We test the fragility of the price cascades in two further treatments. First, we break the monopoly on each signal by revealing it to two subjects, and then we increase that number to four. It is only when we inform four participants, or one-half of the market, that cascades fail to form and information starts to aggregate in the market.
语种	中文
内容类型	研究报告
源URL	[http://dspace.xmu.edu.cn/handle/2288/56792]
专题	王亚南院－工作文稿
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Jason Shachat,Anand Srinivasan. Informational Price Cascades and Non-aggregation of Asymmetric Information in Experimental Asset Markets. 2013.

个性服务

查看访问统计

相关权益政策

暂无数据

收藏/分享

除非特别说明，本系统中所有内容都受版权保护，并保留所有权利。