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	Decentralization with political trump: Vertical control, local accountability and regional disparities in China
	Tsui, Kai-Yuen ; Wang, Youqiang
	2010-05-10 ; 2010-05-10
关键词	fiscal decentralization incentives revenue control vertical bureaucratic control regional disparities FEDERALISM CENTRALIZATION INSTITUTIONS INCENTIVES TRANSITION STYLE Economics
中文摘要	Motivated by China's experience in the reform era, we study the fiscal relations between central and local governments embedded in a vertical control system with local officials appointed by the central government. The probability of their reappointment depends, in part, on how well they perform in fulfilling their mandates from above. Self-interested local bureaucrats decide on the amount of predatory charges to be collected and the amount of public goods provided to increase their chances of survival, while at the same time maximizing the expected surplus accruing to their private agendas. Within the framework of this model, we explore how such issues as fiscal decentralization, local accountability and regional disparities interact with the stringency of the vertical control system. The paper also contributes to the discussion of the divergent experience of China and Russia. (C) 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
语种	英语 ; 英语
出版者	ELSEVIER SCIENCE INC ; NEW YORK ; 360 PARK AVE SOUTH, NEW YORK, NY 10010-1710 USA
内容类型	期刊论文
源URL	[http://hdl.handle.net/123456789/22457]
专题	清华大学
推荐引用方式 GB/T 7714	Tsui, Kai-Yuen,Wang, Youqiang. Decentralization with political trump: Vertical control, local accountability and regional disparities in China[J],2010, 2010.
APA	Tsui, Kai-Yuen,&Wang, Youqiang.(2010).Decentralization with political trump: Vertical control, local accountability and regional disparities in China..
MLA	Tsui, Kai-Yuen,et al."Decentralization with political trump: Vertical control, local accountability and regional disparities in China".(2010).

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